I’m happy to see that you’ve resumed work on *In The Cells of the Eggplant* and, even better, getting to the heart of the book.
This introduction seems a bit repetitive, though, for someone who has read the previous chapters? You’re addressing someone who skipped the previous chapters and telling them, again, what they need to know. But wouldn’t someone who wants to skip ahead skip this part too?
Since this is a new blog, maybe a recap is appropriate here, but as part of the book, I think it’s better to trust that someone who skipped ahead too far will go back if they’re feeling confused.
My theory here was that the Parts will be bound as separate volumes. It's plausible that someone would get Part Four (i.e. volume four) without having read the previous ones at all.
I'm very excited to see your draft, David, and I'll post my reactions to it soon. I'm commenting now to highlight a book (and a review of it) that I think will be of great interest to you. 'The book is Rules: A Short History of What We Live By' by Lorraine Daston. (I noticed you praised her book 'Objectivety' in one of your chapters.) This book review (entitled 'Critique of Pure Mindlessness', though 'Critique of Pure Meaninglessness' might be more fitting) gives an excellent overview of Daston's line of argument: https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/review/critique-of-pure-mindlessness/ .
In a nutshell, Daston highlights that the word 'rule' used to have two complementary meanings: paradigm and algorithm. Here's how the reviewer puts it:
"This furnishes the platform for her double intervention. Firstly, she seeks to recover the ‘lost coherence’ of the pre-modern category of rule in European culture, which for centuries accommodated meanings – rule-as-model and rule-as-algorithm – subsequently deemed antithetical to one another. Secondly, she attempts to trace the progressive narrowing of the meaning of rules, whereby algorithms not only dethroned models as the pre-eminent rules but simultaneously caused the latter to appear impervious to rational scrutiny. It is this second move that gives Daston’s analysis its critical edge. For it enables her to inscribe her history of rules in the broader context of a history of rationality."
From this passage, I think you can see what's so exciting about Daston's book: it provides a historical analysis of the emergence (and divergence) of the concept of rationality from the broader category of reasonableness. And this divergence of the two aspects of rules (paradigm/model and algorithm) has led us to be suspicious of the intuition or wisdom required to harness rationality. As the reviewer puts it:
"The new precedence assumed by rules in modern societies upended this hierarchy completely. It is not just that the algorithm has replaced the model as the pre-eminent rule. As the response to Kuhn’s privileging of paradigms attests, algorithmic rationality has made the intelligence that sanctions departing from the rule in order to model it more effectively appear suspect in comparison. The faculty once claimed to be coterminous with reason itself could now be dismissed as mere intuition and subjectivity, and as such inscrutable and resistant to analysis. In the interest of maintaining well-ordered polities, modern societies seek to narrow the margin for judgement and discretion to a minimum."
I highly recommend at least reading the review. I think you'll find it resonates strongly with your themes for the relationship of reasonableness, rationality, and meta-rationality.
If you ask "Do you want me to post drafts and notes about X topic?" my answer will be "yes". If instead of a yes/no question, you were to ask a mutiple-choice question about which of your topics on which I'm most eager to see your unpublished notes and drafts, it would be the follow-up essays on stage theory. You alluded to these unpublished notes at the end of your essay about Misunderstanding Stage Theory. https://meaningness.com/misunderstanding-stage-theory
I'm pretty sure they are supportive of parts 3 and 4 of In The Cells Of The Eggplant, if not quite belonging there.
You listed them as follows:
"- How to use adult stage theory: is this good for anything?
- Lag: what is a stage, anyway? remodeling the ontology
- The circumrational shantytown: the dire social and cultural effects of stranding half our population at stage 3.5 by requiring semi-systematicity for employment
- The landscape between stages 4 and 5: landmarks in the trackless territory
- The past, present, and future of stage theory as science: where did this stuff come from, and why should I believe any of it?"
I completely agree—I most want to write about stage theory. It's what I'm most interested in now. For several pragmatic reasons, I decided to do meta-rationality first. Plus, lots of people write about stage theory, whereas no one else writes about meta-rationality, so it seems like more unique value.
Also, because I'm fired up about it now, I'm understanding it better, and it seems to make sense to wait until that levels off before writing.
Much of the new understanding is coming from conversations with Charlie, who applies the framework in their coaching/mentoring/teaching work, and who is also doing extensive coursework, partly to learn more, and maybe also to get accredited.
As you know, it's hard for me to predict what I will write next. I'm going to try to mostly keep on track with the meta-rationality book, but I expect (and hope, actually) that pieces from other projects will pop out occasionally. Stage theory is the most likely to do that.
I've had the idea of virtue on my mind recently. Is meta-rationality any different than being virtuous? Section 1.1 of https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ seems quite in-line with your exposition of meta-rationality as
> The essence of meta-rationality is actually caring for the concrete situation, including all its context, complexity, and nebulosity, with its purposes, participants, and paraphernalia.
Yes, meta-rationality is a form of virtue. There's a concept of "epistemic virtue," and meta-rationality is that (maybe more than general ethical virtue, although there's that there too). I wrote about epistemic virtue and meta-rationality in "Upgrade your cargo cult for the win" (https://metarationality.com/upgrade-your-cargo-cult).
Section 1.2 of the SEP article you linked is about "practical wisdom," and that's probably an even better way of thinking about meta-rationality. It's understanding *how* you can best benefit situations, more than just a desire or intention or hope to do so.
Thanks, I didn't know that quote! Apparently the whole thing is:
> If you are out to describe the truth, leave elegance to the tailor.
Re:
> Genuine Understanding (even if not completely legible)✅
Yes... the tricky bit is saying more that's useful about what genuine understanding is. An upcoming chapter of Part Four tries to do that—although the question remains fairly murky.
Wow, this is incredible. I’ve been trying to find a way to explain the reasoning behind my fluid ontological beliefs for a bit now, and I feel like meta-rationality captures it perfectly. Maybe this is a simplification, but would it be reasonable to think of it as the middle way between rationalism and intuition?
That might be a good way to think about meta-rationality initially! It's accurate inasmuch as meta-rationality is partly mysterious (like intuition).
The post mentions a problem with "intuition" as concept, though, which is that it often means just "some mental process we can't say anything about." Fortunately, we *can* say some things about how meta-rationality works.
Ok yeah, that makes a lot of sense. I feel like I'm at the edges of my current grokking ability with this (even though I think you described it perfectly).
Like, the line between "definable enough to put into a framework" and "not explainable via traditional rationalism" seems so incredibly razor-thin to me, to the point where I don't know if it actually exists. I guess even the fact that meta-rationalism is gesturing at nebulosity is kind of the point though.
I definitely haven't thought through this enough to make a meaningful argument; thanks a bunch for the response!
Perhaps instead of a middle way that is half-wrong about each of two erroneous positions-- or which gets the worst of both worlds in what Chapman calls a "muddled middle" -- one could say it's more like a complete way. https://meaningness.com/no-middle-way
Thanks David! I'm curious - are you intending to draw connections between your work on meta-rationality with current theories regarding the mind-body connection, particularly through the lens of AI? As one theory has it (as I understand it), to initiate movement, the brain forms a false deliberate hallucination that it is already moving. This works because the brain assigns this belief low precision such that the belief persists, unchecked, passing the buck to the body which springs into action. The body is left with the work of righting any prediction error. The hallucination becomes self-fulfilling - but only because the brain gets caught out to lunch somewhere. So, to do well, you need to stop worrying about doing well... I've been a student of martial arts for over 45 years and see this as THE ultimate challenge any serious student has to contend with.
Thanks for the comment, Brian! The approach I'm taking in this book is to almost entirely ignore cognitive science, because—although it's interesting—the sorts of phenomena the book covers are ones the science hasn't yet got useful evidence on.
Re-reading this because I wanted to refresh my memory of differences between multi rationality n meta rationality
N new question arises when I re-read this line
> caring more for the situation than about abstractions.
Let’s say there’s a nebulous understanding I want to acquire (I chose understanding over words like skill / knowledge because it feels the least worst)
Like power or autonomy
N no matter how I try I cannot avoid thinking or communicating in abstractions
How to deepen understanding without accidentally caring abt the abstractions more than understanding while still having to think n communicate using abstractions?
Well, it's a matter of redirecting attention to the concrete from the abstract. This is the opposite of STEM training, and may be somewhat difficult at first for those of us who work in tech (for example). It may take quite a lot of effort over a few years. Commonly, those who have made the effort report major improvements in their lives.
There are many practices effective for this. Examples include opening awareness meditation, dancing, bodywork methods such as the Alexander Technique, any sort of artistic craft.
It may not be obvious at first how these develop power and autonomy—but, if those are your goal, they do.
I have a theory that people who got good at STEM, consciously or unconsciously figure out how to make abstractions concrete (reify?) which became a felt sense.
> I have a theory that people who got good at STEM, consciously or unconsciously figure out how to make abstractions concrete (reify?) which became a felt sense.
Yes, I think this is true and important. It's not actually possible to manipulate abstract objects, because those don't exist in the material world. So we find ways of using concrete, material activities as analogs. (This is a main point of Part Three of the meta-rationality book!)
When doing that, it's usually necessary to screen out irrelevant perceptual distractions. Training ourselves to do that is what can make it difficult to fully immerse ourselves in open perceptual experience.
I’m happy to see that you’ve resumed work on *In The Cells of the Eggplant* and, even better, getting to the heart of the book.
This introduction seems a bit repetitive, though, for someone who has read the previous chapters? You’re addressing someone who skipped the previous chapters and telling them, again, what they need to know. But wouldn’t someone who wants to skip ahead skip this part too?
Since this is a new blog, maybe a recap is appropriate here, but as part of the book, I think it’s better to trust that someone who skipped ahead too far will go back if they’re feeling confused.
Thanks, that makes sense!
My theory here was that the Parts will be bound as separate volumes. It's plausible that someone would get Part Four (i.e. volume four) without having read the previous ones at all.
I see! In that case, I think sign-posting it as a recap is the way to go.
I'm very excited to see your draft, David, and I'll post my reactions to it soon. I'm commenting now to highlight a book (and a review of it) that I think will be of great interest to you. 'The book is Rules: A Short History of What We Live By' by Lorraine Daston. (I noticed you praised her book 'Objectivety' in one of your chapters.) This book review (entitled 'Critique of Pure Mindlessness', though 'Critique of Pure Meaninglessness' might be more fitting) gives an excellent overview of Daston's line of argument: https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/review/critique-of-pure-mindlessness/ .
In a nutshell, Daston highlights that the word 'rule' used to have two complementary meanings: paradigm and algorithm. Here's how the reviewer puts it:
"This furnishes the platform for her double intervention. Firstly, she seeks to recover the ‘lost coherence’ of the pre-modern category of rule in European culture, which for centuries accommodated meanings – rule-as-model and rule-as-algorithm – subsequently deemed antithetical to one another. Secondly, she attempts to trace the progressive narrowing of the meaning of rules, whereby algorithms not only dethroned models as the pre-eminent rules but simultaneously caused the latter to appear impervious to rational scrutiny. It is this second move that gives Daston’s analysis its critical edge. For it enables her to inscribe her history of rules in the broader context of a history of rationality."
From this passage, I think you can see what's so exciting about Daston's book: it provides a historical analysis of the emergence (and divergence) of the concept of rationality from the broader category of reasonableness. And this divergence of the two aspects of rules (paradigm/model and algorithm) has led us to be suspicious of the intuition or wisdom required to harness rationality. As the reviewer puts it:
"The new precedence assumed by rules in modern societies upended this hierarchy completely. It is not just that the algorithm has replaced the model as the pre-eminent rule. As the response to Kuhn’s privileging of paradigms attests, algorithmic rationality has made the intelligence that sanctions departing from the rule in order to model it more effectively appear suspect in comparison. The faculty once claimed to be coterminous with reason itself could now be dismissed as mere intuition and subjectivity, and as such inscrutable and resistant to analysis. In the interest of maintaining well-ordered polities, modern societies seek to narrow the margin for judgement and discretion to a minimum."
I highly recommend at least reading the review. I think you'll find it resonates strongly with your themes for the relationship of reasonableness, rationality, and meta-rationality.
Thank you very much! This seems highly relevant, and the earlier work of Daston's I've read has been excellent. I've queued it to read!
If you ask "Do you want me to post drafts and notes about X topic?" my answer will be "yes". If instead of a yes/no question, you were to ask a mutiple-choice question about which of your topics on which I'm most eager to see your unpublished notes and drafts, it would be the follow-up essays on stage theory. You alluded to these unpublished notes at the end of your essay about Misunderstanding Stage Theory. https://meaningness.com/misunderstanding-stage-theory
I'm pretty sure they are supportive of parts 3 and 4 of In The Cells Of The Eggplant, if not quite belonging there.
You listed them as follows:
"- How to use adult stage theory: is this good for anything?
- Lag: what is a stage, anyway? remodeling the ontology
- The circumrational shantytown: the dire social and cultural effects of stranding half our population at stage 3.5 by requiring semi-systematicity for employment
- The landscape between stages 4 and 5: landmarks in the trackless territory
- The past, present, and future of stage theory as science: where did this stuff come from, and why should I believe any of it?"
Thanks, this is interesting and helpful!
I completely agree—I most want to write about stage theory. It's what I'm most interested in now. For several pragmatic reasons, I decided to do meta-rationality first. Plus, lots of people write about stage theory, whereas no one else writes about meta-rationality, so it seems like more unique value.
Also, because I'm fired up about it now, I'm understanding it better, and it seems to make sense to wait until that levels off before writing.
Much of the new understanding is coming from conversations with Charlie, who applies the framework in their coaching/mentoring/teaching work, and who is also doing extensive coursework, partly to learn more, and maybe also to get accredited.
As you know, it's hard for me to predict what I will write next. I'm going to try to mostly keep on track with the meta-rationality book, but I expect (and hope, actually) that pieces from other projects will pop out occasionally. Stage theory is the most likely to do that.
I've had the idea of virtue on my mind recently. Is meta-rationality any different than being virtuous? Section 1.1 of https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ seems quite in-line with your exposition of meta-rationality as
> The essence of meta-rationality is actually caring for the concrete situation, including all its context, complexity, and nebulosity, with its purposes, participants, and paraphernalia.
Yes, meta-rationality is a form of virtue. There's a concept of "epistemic virtue," and meta-rationality is that (maybe more than general ethical virtue, although there's that there too). I wrote about epistemic virtue and meta-rationality in "Upgrade your cargo cult for the win" (https://metarationality.com/upgrade-your-cargo-cult).
Section 1.2 of the SEP article you linked is about "practical wisdom," and that's probably an even better way of thinking about meta-rationality. It's understanding *how* you can best benefit situations, more than just a desire or intention or hope to do so.
> rationalism’s explanation is completely false, couldn’t work even in principle, and is often catastrophically misleading for practice
For some reason reminds me of Einstein quote elegance is for tailors
> in understanding meta-rationality, we need to avoid two extremes: anti-rational Romantic intuitionism, and premature rationalist formalization.
My own shorthand for this is
- Intuition 🚫
- Theory/formula too elegant or too pat 🚫
- Genuine Understanding (even if not completely legible)✅
Thanks, I didn't know that quote! Apparently the whole thing is:
> If you are out to describe the truth, leave elegance to the tailor.
Re:
> Genuine Understanding (even if not completely legible)✅
Yes... the tricky bit is saying more that's useful about what genuine understanding is. An upcoming chapter of Part Four tries to do that—although the question remains fairly murky.
Wow, this is incredible. I’ve been trying to find a way to explain the reasoning behind my fluid ontological beliefs for a bit now, and I feel like meta-rationality captures it perfectly. Maybe this is a simplification, but would it be reasonable to think of it as the middle way between rationalism and intuition?
Glad you like it, Adam!
That might be a good way to think about meta-rationality initially! It's accurate inasmuch as meta-rationality is partly mysterious (like intuition).
The post mentions a problem with "intuition" as concept, though, which is that it often means just "some mental process we can't say anything about." Fortunately, we *can* say some things about how meta-rationality works.
Ok yeah, that makes a lot of sense. I feel like I'm at the edges of my current grokking ability with this (even though I think you described it perfectly).
Like, the line between "definable enough to put into a framework" and "not explainable via traditional rationalism" seems so incredibly razor-thin to me, to the point where I don't know if it actually exists. I guess even the fact that meta-rationalism is gesturing at nebulosity is kind of the point though.
I definitely haven't thought through this enough to make a meaningful argument; thanks a bunch for the response!
Perhaps instead of a middle way that is half-wrong about each of two erroneous positions-- or which gets the worst of both worlds in what Chapman calls a "muddled middle" -- one could say it's more like a complete way. https://meaningness.com/no-middle-way
Gracias
Thanks David! I'm curious - are you intending to draw connections between your work on meta-rationality with current theories regarding the mind-body connection, particularly through the lens of AI? As one theory has it (as I understand it), to initiate movement, the brain forms a false deliberate hallucination that it is already moving. This works because the brain assigns this belief low precision such that the belief persists, unchecked, passing the buck to the body which springs into action. The body is left with the work of righting any prediction error. The hallucination becomes self-fulfilling - but only because the brain gets caught out to lunch somewhere. So, to do well, you need to stop worrying about doing well... I've been a student of martial arts for over 45 years and see this as THE ultimate challenge any serious student has to contend with.
Thanks for the comment, Brian! The approach I'm taking in this book is to almost entirely ignore cognitive science, because—although it's interesting—the sorts of phenomena the book covers are ones the science hasn't yet got useful evidence on.
Re-reading this because I wanted to refresh my memory of differences between multi rationality n meta rationality
N new question arises when I re-read this line
> caring more for the situation than about abstractions.
Let’s say there’s a nebulous understanding I want to acquire (I chose understanding over words like skill / knowledge because it feels the least worst)
Like power or autonomy
N no matter how I try I cannot avoid thinking or communicating in abstractions
How to deepen understanding without accidentally caring abt the abstractions more than understanding while still having to think n communicate using abstractions?
Well, it's a matter of redirecting attention to the concrete from the abstract. This is the opposite of STEM training, and may be somewhat difficult at first for those of us who work in tech (for example). It may take quite a lot of effort over a few years. Commonly, those who have made the effort report major improvements in their lives.
There are many practices effective for this. Examples include opening awareness meditation, dancing, bodywork methods such as the Alexander Technique, any sort of artistic craft.
It may not be obvious at first how these develop power and autonomy—but, if those are your goal, they do.
I digress.
> This is the opposite of STEM training,
I have a theory that people who got good at STEM, consciously or unconsciously figure out how to make abstractions concrete (reify?) which became a felt sense.
Examples include Feynman's wobbly plates story https://pubs.aip.org/aapt/ajp/article-abstract/75/3/240/1056339/Feynman-s-wobbling-plate?redirectedFrom=fulltext, mathematicians' own technically incorrect explanations they don't share with other people but they use it just for themselves to understand certain concepts.
These usefully "wrong" tricks end up being a blocker to "redirect attention to the concrete from the abstract"
Your thoughts?
Sorry for the digression.
> Examples include
I just reached out to a AT teacher near where i live.
Let's see how that turns out
> I have a theory that people who got good at STEM, consciously or unconsciously figure out how to make abstractions concrete (reify?) which became a felt sense.
Yes, I think this is true and important. It's not actually possible to manipulate abstract objects, because those don't exist in the material world. So we find ways of using concrete, material activities as analogs. (This is a main point of Part Three of the meta-rationality book!)
When doing that, it's usually necessary to screen out irrelevant perceptual distractions. Training ourselves to do that is what can make it difficult to fully immerse ourselves in open perceptual experience.
> Yes, I think this is true and important.
Thank you. It’s good to get your feedback so I know my understanding of meta r is getting closer
> abstract objects
I now understand this as oxymoron and unavoidable
> unconsciously
So I guess I was doing it (using concrete objects as analogs for abstractions / screening out irrelevant perceptual distractions) unconsciously
> screen out irrelevant perceptual distractions
Thank you for this. This is helpful for understanding
> Training ourselves to do that is what can make it difficult to fully immerse ourselves in open perceptual experience.
And this is useful for practical reasons.